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Recently, the Supreme Court of the State of New York, Appellate Division ruled in the case of Bank of N.Y. v Silverberg 86 A.D. 3d 274, 926 N.Y.S. 2d 532(App. Div. 2d Dept. June 7, 2011) that in a transaction involving MERS where there was an assignment of only the mortgage, but not a specific assignment of the note, that the assignment is defective and the foreclosure action would be dismissed based on the lack of standing of the Plaintiff. Per Silverberg, transactions involving MERS would not give the assignee of the mortgage standing since the ability of MERS under agreements, to record and potentially assign the mortgage, does not concurrently assign the note, and without a specific and authorized assignment of the note the Plaintiff lacks standing.
As the Court, in Silverberg held:“The principal issue ripe for determination by this Court, and which was left unaddressed by the majority in Matter of MERSCORP (id.), is whether MERS, as nominee and mortgagee for purposes of recording, can assign the right to foreclose upon a mortgage to a plaintiff in a foreclosure action absent MERS’s right to, or possession of, the actual underlying promissory note.
As a general matter, once a promissory note is tendered to and accepted by an assignee, the mortgage passes as an incident to the note…
[5][6]By contrast, “a transfer of the mortgage without the debt is a nullity, and no interest is acquired by it”…
The plaintiff relies upon the language in the consolidation agreement, which provides that MERS was “acting solely as a nominee for [Countrywide] and [Countrywide’s] successors and assigns . . . For purposes of recording this agreement, MERS is the mortgagee of record.” However, as “nominee,” MERS’s authority was limited to only those powers which were specifically conferred to it and authorized by the lender (see Black’s Law Dictionary 1076 [8th ed 2004] [defining a nominee as “(a) person designated to act in place of another, (usually) in a very limited way”]). Hence, although the consolidation agreement gave MERS the right to assign the mortgages themselves, it did not specifically give MERS the right to assign the underlying notes, and the assignment of the notes was thus beyond MERS’s authority as nominee or agent of the lender.
Therefore, assuming that the consolidation agreement transformed MERS into a mortgagee for the purpose of recording—even though it never loaned any money, never had a right to receive payment of the loan, and never had a right to foreclose on the property upon a default in payment—the consolidation agreement did not give MERS title to the note, nor does the record show that the note was physically delivered to MERS. Indeed, the consolidation agreement defines “Note Holder,” rather than the mortgagee, as the “Lender or anyone who succeeds to Lender’s right under the Agreement and who is entitled to receive the payments under the Agreement.” Hence, the plaintiff, which merely stepped into the shoes of MERS, its assignor, and gained only that to which its assignor was entitled (see Matter of International Ribbon Mills[Arjan Ribbons], 36 NY2d 121, 126; see also UCC 3-201 [“(t)ransfer of an instrument vests in the transferee such rights as the transferor has therein”]), did not acquire the power to foreclose by way of the corrected assignment…
In sum, because MERS was never the lawful holder or assignee of the notes described and identified in the consolidation agreement, the corrected assignment of mortgage is a nullity, and MERS was without authority to assign the power to foreclose to the plaintiff. Consequently, the plaintiff failed to show that it had standing to foreclose.
MERS purportedly holds approximately 60 million mortgage loans. This Court is mindful of the impact that this decision may have on the mortgage industry in New York, and perhaps the nation. Nonetheless, the law must not yield to expediency and the convenience of lending institutions. Proper procedures must be followed to ensure the reliability of the chain of ownership, to secure the dependable transfer of property, and to assure the enforcement of the rules that govern real property.
Accordingly, the Supreme Court should have granted the defendants’ motion pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(3) to dismiss the complaint insofar as asserted against them for lack of standing. Thus, the order is reversed, on the law, and the motion of the defendants Stephen Silverberg and Fredrica Silverberg pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(3) to dismiss the complaint insofar as asserted against them for lack of standing is granted.”
3. Therefore, given the high possibility of a defective assignment from MERS, the Silverberg decision will be of great benefit in helping foreclosure defendants assert that the plaintiff never acquired standing and that the foreclosure should be dismissed.
